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FROTH UNITED STATES REALTY TO AMERICAN
TRAILER RENTALS: THE AVAILABILITY
OF DEBTOR RELIEF FOR THE
MIDDLE-SIZED CORPORATION
BENHJAMINT HEINTRAUB*
HARRIS LEVIN**
THE year 1940 witnessed SEC v. United States Realty & Improvemcnt
Co.,' the first decision of the Supreme Court resolving a problem of
jurisdictional conflict between the reorganization of a corporation under
Chapter X2 and rehabilitation under Chapter XIV No one could have
realized then that this case would become the keystone upon which all
future decisions in this area would be built. Nevertheless, it has loomed
mightily in the analysis and discussion of principles directed at affirming
the viability of Chapter X, vis-h-vis Chapter XI, as a required means of
reorganization of corporations with public securities outstanding.
During the succeeding twenty-five years, a slow but steady stream of
cases has wended its way through the United States Courts of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, and, invariably, these cases all returned to the
cornerstone case for comfort through stare decisis. Indeed, the latest de-
cision of the Supreme Court, SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co.,
4
strongly reaffirmed the principles of United States Realty.' Such approval
again brings to the forefront for introspection the host of cases decided
over the past twenty-five years. From this group we have culled for dis-
cussion the ten leading cases.'
When we realize that, in this era of the greatest upsurge in business,
a newly organized enterprise has less than a 50-50 chance of survival,7
we begin to understand the heavy and insistent pressure at the doors
of corporate reorganization. Indeed, the failures are not confined solely
to the area of newly organized businesses; the percentages are also sig-
* Adjunct Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School; Member of the New,
York Bar.
** Member of the New York Bar.
1. 310 U.S. 434 (1940).
2. Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276,52 Stat. SS3 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 01-676 (1964).
3. Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-99, 52 Stat. 905 (1935), 11 U.S.C. § 701-99 (1964).
4. 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
5. Id. at 613.
6. For an examination of the financial structures of the various debtors in theze caze-, sce
appendix infra.
7. Porter, Business Failures, N.Y. Post, July 16, 1965, p. 30, cols. 2-3, "icuzIng Dun &
Bradstreet's statistics.
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nificant for well established companies.' Although the relief chapters of
the Bankruptcy Act cannot provide preventive assistance, they are de-
signed to aid the financially sick corporate debtor to get on its feet and
to become a useful economic unit. Yet, the hospitality of this reception
hinges upon whether the debtor has the proper credentials to allow it to
remain in one chapter as against another. Since this rejection in one
chapter often results in a failure of reorganization and a bankruptcy,
such determination is of the utmost concern to the three principal parties
involved, namely, the debtor, its creditors, and its public investors.,
Indeed, on occasion, the corporate debtor may be repulsed on both
fronts. In In the Matter of Liberty Mortgage Corp.,10 the debtor had
filed a petition under Chapter XI for an arrangement. The Securities
and Exchange Commission moved pursuant to Section 328 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act" to dismiss the proceeding unless the debtor amended its
petition to comply with the requirements of Chapter X, and an order
was entered by the court requiring the debtor to file an amended petition
or face dismissal. The debtor then filed its petition under Chapter X.
Once within Chapter X, the debtor hardly had time to relax before it
was met with a motion to dismiss the Chapter X petition on the ground
that it had not been filed in good faith, i.e., it was unreasonable to expect
that a plan of reorganization could be effected.' 2 This motion was opposed
by the debtor and by the Commission. The fact that this case had been
transferred from Chapter XI on the ground that Chapter XI was not
the proper proceeding made no difference. The court dismissed the Chap-
ter X proceeding.
The Liberty Mortgage case represents a variance from the norm. The
8. "One significant trend of recent years is the jump in failures among well established
businesses-those 10 years of age or older." Id. col. 2.
9. In SEC v. Canandaigua Enterprises Corp., 339 F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1964), the court
stated: "[W]e know of no scale sufficently sensitive to weigh the near certainty of achieving
a Chapter XI arrangement that may not be altogether fair and equitable against the possible
emergence of a better plan from a Chapter X proceeding during which the patient may die
before an operating room is ready or for which the fees of the surgeon and others In
attendance may exceed the patient's means."
10. 245 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
11. Bankruptcy Act § 328, 66 Stat. 432 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 728 (1964).
12. Bankruptcy Act §§ 141, 146(3), 52 Stat. 887 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 541, 546(3) (1964).
Other grounds warranting a dismissal for failure to file in good faith are: "iTlhe petitioning
creditors have acquired their claims for the purpose of filing the petition; or . . . adequate
relief would be obtainable by a debtor's petition ...or . . . a prior proceeding is pending
in any court and it appears that the interests of creditors and stockholders would be best
subserved in such prior proceeding." Bankruptcy Act §§ 146(1)-(2), (4), 52 Stat. 887 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §§ 546(1)-(2), (4) (1964). For a discussion of good faith, see Weintraub & Levin,
Practical Guide to Bankruptcy and Debtor Relief 190-91 (1964).
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usual procedure is to move under section 32S to transfer from
Chapter XI to Chapter X on the ground that the proper proceeding is
Chapter X. It is a rarity that the transferred proceeding is also rebuffed
in the Chapter X proceeding. In some instances the reorganization is
consummated,' 3 and in others the debtor is adjudicated a bankrupt upon
consent and upon its failure to file an amended petition.14 Our problem,
however, is to evaluate the criteria attendant upon a direction for a
transfer and to interpret present judicial trends. For these purposes, we
turn to the earliest of the high Court cases.
I. THE United States Realty CAse
The principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States
Realty have been reaffirmed, as indicated above, in SEC v. American
Trailer Reztals Co., 5 as well as in the earlier case of General Stores
Corp. v. Sldensky.'6
In United States Realty, the debtor was a corporation engaged in the
business of management and ownership of real estate investments. Its
financial structure consisted of 900,000 shares of capital stock, listed
on the New York Stock Exchange, which were held by 7,000 stock-
holders. Its liabilities were in excess of 5,000,000 dollars, which included
two series of publicly held debentures aggregating 2,339,000 dollars,
which were secured by a pledge of corporate stock of little value and
a 3,000,000 dollar note secured by a first mortgage owned by the debtor.
In addition, the debtor was also liable as a guarantor of mortgage certifi-
cates of 3,710,500 dollars issued by its wholly owned subsidiary, Trinity
Building Corporation of New York, and these certificates were in the
hands of 900 holders. These certificates were in default and were secured
by a mortgage on Trinity's real estate.
Before the maturity of the mortgage certificates, the debtor and Trinity
proposed a plan to certificate holders to extend the maturity date of
the certificates, to reduce the interest rate, and to modify the sinking
fund. Debtor's guaranty was to be modified accordingly, and sinking
fund payments were to be eliminated. The plan was to be consummated
by utilizing two proceedings: the filing of a Chapter XI proceeding by
the debtor modifying its guaranty but leaving unaffected its stock and
other indebtedness; and an attempt, instituted on behalf of Trinity in
the New York State courts, to secure an appropriate modification of
13. See, e.g, General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); In the Matter of
Liberty Baking Corp, 1S9 F. Supp. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
14. See, e.g., In re Lea Fabrics, Inc., 272 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated as moot p r
curiam, 363 U.S. 417 (1960).
15. 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
16. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
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Trinity's primary obligation on the certificate. Thus, the debtor sought
an arrangement for itself under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act, and
a modification of its subsidiaries' secured indebtedness under New York
law.
In dismissing the petition as not having been properly filed under Chap-
ter XI, the Supreme Court held: (1) The debtor, "although a large corpo-
ration with its securities widely distributed in the hands of the public,
is nevertheless within the literal terms of Chapter XI . . .17 and, there-
fore, can file an arrangement under Chapter XI. 8 (2) Chapter XI pro-
vides a summary procedure for a debtor seeking an arrangement of its
unsecured debts and is available to any person who could become a
bankrupt under Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act. 9 (3) There is no defini-
tion or classification in either chapter which would enable the court to
place a corporate debtor exclusively in one chapter rather than in the
other.2° (4) The court has jurisdiction to entertain the proceeding of a
corporate debtor in Chapter XI, but in all cases the question involved
is the propriety of such jurisdiction, and the answer to this turns on con-
siderations
growing out of the public policy of the Act found both in its legislative history and
in an analysis of its terms, and of the authority of the court clothed with equity
powers and sitting in bankruptcy to give effect to that policy through its power to
withhold relief under Chapter XI when relief is available under Chapter X, which
is adequate and more consonant with that policy.2'
(5) It did not appear that any fair and equitable arrangement in the best
interests of creditors could be effected without some rearrangement of
the capital structure of the debtor.2
The effect of these holdings on succeeding cases was to thoroughly
entrench the principle that a corporation with public security holders
could file a petition under Chapter XI provided its plan (unlike the
instant one) did not require some readjustment, directly or indirectly,
of the rights of the public investors. Such readjustment could not be
accomplished without the aids for the protection of creditors and the
public interest which Chapter X provides, i.e., the independent trustee,
the intervention of the Commission, the examination under Section 167
of the Bankruptcy Act,23 and other provisions of close judicial surveil-
lance.
17. 310 U.S. at 445.
18. Ibid.
19. Id. at 446; see Bankruptcy Act § 4, 52 Stat. 845 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
20. 310 U.S. at 447.
21. Id. at 448.
22. Id. at 453-54.
23. Bankruptcy Act § 167, 52 Stat. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 567 (1964).
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In 1952, twelve years after United States Realty, section 32824 was
added to Chapter XI. This section provides that, upon the application
of the Commission or any party in interest, the judge, upon finding that
the proceedings should have been brought under Chapter X of the act,
may enter an order dismissing the proceedings under Chapter UI unless
the petition is amended to comply with the requirements of Chapter X.
The House report indicated that the transfer provisions codified the
United States Realty decision and adopted the procedure of section 14723
for transferring a proceeding to Chapter XI."0
At the same time, section 366 was amended2 7 to eliminate the provi-
sion that a plan under Chapter XI had to be fair and equitable. -s The
Senate report indicated that the amendment was intended to eliminate
a provision which was impractical in Chapter XI. No corporate debtor
with stock ownership substantially identical with management could
effectuate an arrangement by scaling down its debts since no such plan
would be "fair and equitable" inasmuch as there could be no retention
of a stock interest by management where senior interests such as credit-
ors were not being paid in full. -29
As Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated in his dissent in General Stores,
the lower court had given no consideration to the elimination of the fair
and equitable rule from Chapter XI. 0 With this elimination from United
States Realty, it is fair to assume, as he indicated, that the generaliza-
tions of United States Realty should be restricted to its own facts,
namely, that "a critical reading of the extended opinion in the Realty
case requires the conclusion that all its general observations must be
limited to the particular situation which elicited them. 3 '
24. Bankruptcy Act § 323, 66 Stat. 432 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1964). The sccLion
authorizes dismissal where the proceeding was not properly in Chapter XI. Prior thereto, the
authority to dismiss was based on the inherent power of a court of bankruptcy. For exercise
of a similar power to adjudicate a Chapter XI debtor a bankrupt, see Ira Haupt & Co. v.
Klebanow, 348 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1965).
25. Bankruptcy Act § 147, 52 Stat. 333 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1964).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 2320, S2d Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1952); see SEC v. Canandaigua Enter-
prises Corp., 339 F.2d 14, 13 (2d Cir. 1964).
27. Bankruptcy Act § 366, 66 Stat. 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1964), amending 52 Stat.
911 (193S).
28. General Stores Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 US. 462, 471 (1956) (dissenting opinion).
Mr. Justice Frankfurter described the fair and equitable doctrine as "the absolute rule for
equity reorganizations" which had been established earlier by the Court. Id. at 471 (dis-enting
opinion), citing Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 303 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 4S2 (1913).
29. S. Rep. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
30. 350 U.S. at 471, 472 (dissenting opinion).
31. Id. at 471 (dissenting opinion).
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The Court in General Stores summarized the United States Realty
holding:
There one class of creditors was being asked to make sacrifices, while the position
of the stockholders remained unimpaired . . Moreover, the history of the com-
pany raised a serious question "whether any fair and equitable arrangement in the
best interest of creditors" could be effected "without some re-arrangement of its
capital structure."32
To sum up United States Realty, we conclude that the case was trans-
ferred basically because a fair and equitable plan required a readjust-
ment of stockholdings which could not be effected under Chapter XIY3
It is noteworthy that the Court did not discuss any existing irregularities
in connection with management's operation.
II. FROM United States Realty TO General Stores
A. The Mecca Temple Case
A small number of significant appellate cases appeared between the
landmark case and the next Supreme Court decision, General Stores
Corp. v. Shlensky, 4 in 1956. During these sixteen years, the first was
Mecca Temple v. Darrock 5 The debtor was an insolvent membership
corporation of approximately 2,800 members. Its unsecured liabilities
amounted to 1,200,000 dollars, which was raised for a building project
that was foreclosed and for which bonds were issued. These bonds were
originally sold exclusively to members of the debtor but, through in-
heritance and sale, found themselves in the hands of others than the
fraternal members. The corporation's assets included an interest in two
pieces of real property and income from dues. The debtor had filed a
petition under Chapter XI and had submitted an arrangement proposing
to pay each bondholder ten per cent over a period of years. The referee
dismissed the petition sua sponte, holding that the proceedings should
be transferred to Chapter X. The court of appeals, in affirming the
referee, held: (1) there had not been an adequate explanation of the
deficiency between receipts and disbursements;3 0 (2) a better plan
should be given to unsecured creditors and it was not in their best in-
terests; 37 (3) there was a public interest even though the bonds originally
had been privately issued;3 " and, (4) finally, the fair and equitable doc-
32. Id. at 466, quoting from SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.
434, 456 (1940). (Citations omitted.)
33. Bankruptcy Act §§ 307(1)-(2), 52 Stat. 906 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1)-(2) (1964).
34. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
35. 142 F.2d 869 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 784 (1944).
36. 142 F.2d at 871.
37. Ibid.; see Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 66 Stat. 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1964).
38. 142 F.2d at 871.
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trine might presumably dictate that the members' rights might be sub-
ordinated to the rights of other creditors. 9
Again we find a public interest and the fair and equitable doctrine as
the reason for transfer. It would appear that the proceeding was not a
true test of the principles enunciated in United States Realty since the
court was not dealing with a commercial entity.
B. The Transvision Case
In the Matter of Transvision, Inc.10 drew sharp lines of distinction
as to the type of middle-sized corporation which was amenable to Chap-
ter XI even though a public interest was involved. There were 385,000
shares of common stock outstanding, of which management owned 250,-
000, and the balance was owned by 425 public investors. Assets were
nearly 1,000,000 dollars and liabilities were approximately 700,000
dollars. The court of appeals, in affirming the district court, called at-
tention to the fact that this was not a complex debt structure nor a
sizeable diffusion of stock which might intensify "the impulsion to rele-
gate the petitioner to the relief afforded him under Chapter X.'"' More-
over, there was no evidence of wrongdoing. However, this did not fore-
close the Commission or any other interested party from bringing to the
court's attention substantial evidence of wrongdoing or other factors
affecting the debtor's ability to confirm a plan 2
Again the court emphasized the summary nature of Chapter XI
whereby a debtor, to extricate itself from financial straits, may secure
confirmation of an arrangement of its unsecured obligations "with a
minimal disturbance of operations [and] . . . without employing the
elaborate investigatory and protective procedures attendant upon the
usual corporate reorganization proceeding under Chapter X."3
III. THE General Stores CASE
The second decision rendered by the Supreme Court dealing with the
problem of transfer was General Stores Corp. v. Shcnsky." The extent
to which the Supreme Court relied upon United States Realty to base
its decision in General Stores is evident from the Court's indication that
much of the argument on both sides was devoted to the "meaning" of the
United States Realty case.4 Here again, the Court held that the position
39. Id. at S72.
40. 217 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 34S U . . 952 (1955).
41. 217 F.2d at 246.
42. Id. at 247.
43. Id. at 246.
44. 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
45. Id. at 465.
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taken by the Commission, that Chapter X affords relief for corporations
with publicly held securities while Chapter XI is available to those
whose stock is closely held, was rejected.4 The Court emphasized that
the distinction as to the availability of Chapter XI was dependent upon
"whether the formulation of a plan under the control of the debtor, as
provided by c. XI, or the formulation of a plan under the auspices of
disinterested trustees, as assured by c. X and the other protective pro-
visions of that chapter, would better serve 'the public and private in-
terests concerned including those of the debtor.' ,47
Neither the character of the debtor, its capital structure, nor its size
was considered to be controlling. The "needs" test was held to be para-
mount: Was there a need to apply the fair and equitable doctrine, or a
need for readjustment of the debt structure, or for an accounting by
management for misdeeds, or for new management?48
Passing upon these standards as they applied to the facts of the case,
the Court found that there had been one reorganization; heavy short
term loans were impending; shares of stock of valuable subsidiaries had
been pledged; provision should be made for merger of the parent with
the subsidiaries; a balanced capital structure did not exist; and heavy
borrowings on a short term basis indicated disaster for post-confirma-
tion operation.49
Indeed, the Court stated that the paramount consideration was that
the debtor's plan was not feasible. Moreover, it subordinated the fair
and equitable doctrine to the question of feasibility: "A question as to
what is 'fair and equitable' between creditors and stockholders may
eventually be reached in the reorganization. But the paramount issue at
present concerns what is 'feasible.' "'0
Since the application of the fair and equitable doctrine was subor-
dinated to the feasibility problem, it might accordingly be argued that
such a test of feasibility would be made in the arrangement proceeding
which sets up the same standard. We cannot overlook the countervailing
effect of the soundness of the arguments contained in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter. The effect of the elimination of the
fair and equitable doctrine has already been discussed. 1 The other
standards of the utilization of Chapter XI for readjustments with credit-
46. Ibid.
47. Id. at 465, quoting from SEC v. United States Realty & Improvement Co., 310 U.S.
434, 455 (1940).
48. 350 U.S. at 466.
49. Id. at 467-68.
50. Id. at 467. Both chapters require a finding of feasibility. Bankruptcy Act § 221(2), 52
Stat. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621(2) (1964) ; Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), 66 Stat. 433 (1952),
11 U.S.C. § 766(2) (1964).
51. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
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ors where no change in the capital structure is involved, where no irregu-
larities are charged, and where the creditors urge that the arrangement
is for their best interest12 should be given serious consideration in the
evaluation involving a transfer.
IV. FRom General Stores To American Trailer Rentals
The General Stores case emphasized the need for a practical resolu-
tion of a difficult problem, but it also indicated that no hard and fast
rule could be drawn: The guide posts were not riveted to firm founda-
tions, but would depend upon the application of judicial discretion on
a case-to-case basis. 3 The appellate cases of the succeeding ten years
leading up to the next Supreme Court case indicated the feasibility of
the suggested standards.
A. The Wilcox-Gay Case
In In the Matter of Wilcox-Gay Corp.,14 the district court denied the
application of the Commission to transfer the Chapter XI proceeding
to Chapter X, and the court of appeals unanimously affirmed this de-
cision.' The appellate court stated that it had withheld its decision until
the Supreme Court had rendered its opinion in the General Stores case."
Its conclusions from the Court's analysis were that the discretion of the
district court which had relied upon the Transvision decision was a
sound exercise of discretion.5
7
The basis of such discretion was rooted in the following factors: a fea-
sible plan;5" a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation of the debtor; a
benefit to stockholders only in the event that operations were profitable;
adoption of the creditors' assertion that existing management was neces-
sary for the continuation of the business; an opportunity open at all times
for interested parties to call any irregularities to the attention of the court;
the probability that a transfer to Chapter X might be prejudicial to the
ultimate success of the plan; the fact that there was no public interest as
distinguished from public ownership which required the intervention of the
Commission; and, finally, the fact that further investigation was un-
necessary in view of the active participation of the various interests in-
volved, including a creditors' committee."
Moreover, the court of appeals held that the findings of the district
52. Bankruptcy Act § 366, 66 Stat. 433 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 766 (1964).
53. 350 U.S. at 465, 463.
54. 133 F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Mlich. 1955).
55. SEC v. Wilcox-Gay Corp., 231 F.2d S59 (6th Cir. 1956).
56. Id. at 860.
57. Id. at 860-61.
58. Id. at 860.
59. Id. at 860-61.
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court were compatible with the principles of the General Stores case.00
It is interesting to note that emphasis was placed upon the following
factors: the necessity for the continuance of existing management even
though management was in control when insolvency took place; the
capacity of a Chapter XI proceeding to deal with irregularities; the omis-
sion of a reference to the fair and equitable rule; the weight accorded the
recommendation of a creditors' committee; and, finally, the conclusions of
law that the findings were in harmony with General Stores."'
B. The Liberty Case
A year later, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit also applied
the principles of General Stores by holding, in SEC v. Liberty Baking
Corp.,"2 that the proceedings should be transferred from Chapter XI to
Chapter X. In reversing the district court, the appellate court indicated
that the lower court's decision antedated the General Stores case;0 8 and
the court distinguished Wilcox-Gay on the ground that, among other
things, it had previously been in Chapter X.64 Another area of distinction
which the court of appeals indicated was controlling, and which had not
been present in either Transvision or Wilcox-Gay, was a modification of
the claims of public debenture holders."5 In the former cases, the modifica-
tion was only of the obligations of trade and commercial creditors, where-
as in the latter, public investors were being affected. Insofar as the
machinery of Chapter XI was concerned, it would appear that this dis-
tinction was unsound because a plan can affect unsecured creditors,
whether public or private.
C. Several Miscellaneous Cases
Following Wilcox-Gay and Liberty were a trio of cases reflecting the
adverse effects of the adherence to a strict interpretation of United States
Realty and General Stores. In In re Lea Fabrics, Inc.,"0 the Commission
moved to transfer the proceeding to Chapter X even though the plan
sought only to scale down unsecured obligations and did not affect public
security holders. The debtor emphasized that a transfer would mean an
adjudication in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit, in its refusal to transfer,
stated: "Even if a plan evolved under Chapter X which was 'fair and
60. Id. at 861.
61. Id. at 860-61.
62. 240 F.2d 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 930 (1957).
63. 240 F.2d at 511 n.1.
64. Id. at 516 n.10. For the fallacy of these arguments, see Weintraub & Levin, Practical
Guide to Bankruptcy and Debtor Relief 160 (1964).
65. 240 F.2d at 514.
66. 272 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959), vacated as moot per curiam, 363 U.S. 417 (1960).
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equitable'.. the shareholders would stand little chance of profiting by
it." 6'
Again, in In re Herold Radio & Electronics Corp.,"' the debtor's plea
was that a transfer would mean an adjudication in bankruptcy because
there would be no cash flow to support continued operations by a trustee
in Chapter X. The court, however, transferred the proceeding, and bank-
ruptcy followed.
The danger that a debtor will be adjudicated a bankrupt because of a
transfer, as resulted in Herold Radio, is coupled with another fear, a
frustrating possibility, i.e., that the consummation of a plan in Chapter X
may result in the elimination of the public stock interest when the debtor
is found to be insolvent. 9 Under such circumstances, outside interests
will compete for the purchase of the stock of the reorganized company.
A variant of this situation occurred in In re Dilbert's Quality Super-
markets, ITh.c ° In transferring the proceeding to Chapter X, the court
agreed with the Commission's contentions that the financial and capital
structure of the debtor required a complete reorganization and that there
was a question of fairness to public holders of debt securities in the treat-
ment of the subsidiaries' debentures which had been guaranteed by the
parent. The district court relied upon United States Realty and Gencral
Stores, among others. However, the plan of reorganization which was
ultimately consummated provided for an elimination of the interests of the
common stockholders, and the formation of a new corporation since the
debtor was found to be insolvent. Stockholders, both common and pre-
ferred, were held not to be entitled to any equity in the reorganized
corporation. The new issue of stock was issued to unsecured creditors.
Thus, the ultimate aim of reorganization for the benefit of the public
investor resulted in the public stockholders losing the practical benefits of
reorganization.
Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. SEC71 gave vitality to some of the
standards which Mr. Justice Frankfurter enunciated in General Stores.2-
The court stated:
This is a case where no publicly held securities are being readjusted, the creditors
have had Nigorous independent representation, stockholder interests have offered
substantial contributions, and rights to pursue claims for dereliction remain un-
affected. In such circumstances a court can hardly ignore a substantially uncontradicted
67. 272 F.2d at 772. (Citation omitted.)
68. 191 F. Supp. 7S0 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
69. Bankruptcy Act § 216(S), 52 Stat. S95 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 616(3) (1964).
70. 2 Bankr. L. Rep. ff 60, at 799 (E.D.N.Y. March 8, 1963). For other cases see Wein-
traub & Levin, op. dt. supra note 64, at 162.
71. 320 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1963).
72. 350 U.S. at 471 (dissenting opinion).
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factual showing that Chapter XI affords some hope of paying off creditors whereas
Chapter X offers none.73
An analysis of the Grayson-Robinson case indicates that there were no
public securities being affected; that the recommendation of the creditors'
committee was being given consideration; that management was making
a contribution; that the right to prosecute claims against officers and
directors could be pursued; and, finally, that Chapter XI offered some
hope of paying creditors, whereas Chapter X offered none.
Two recent courts of appeals cases are to be considered before arriving
at the last of the Supreme Court cases. In SEC v. Crumpton Builders
Inc., 74 the Fifth Circuit held that the district court exceeded the proper
limits of its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the Chapter XI
proceeding. In reviewing the history of the chapters, the appellate court
summarized the advantages of Chapter X, indicating the safeguards for
public investors therein contained, 75 and the necessity for the utilization
of the fair and equitable doctrine.76 The court also indicated that, al-
though the fair and equitable doctrine had been eliminated from Chapter
XI proceedings, nonetheless, the fairness and equity of any Chapter XI
plan that provided for participation before the dissenting creditors re-
ceived full payment was a relevant consideration.77 Moreover, the court
also indicated that in General Stores the fairness of the reorganization
was subordinated to the needs of the debtor and the feasibility of the
arrangement.
7 s
An interesting observation of the court was its comment: "In spite of
the Supreme Court's clear mandate for a case by case approach, there
have been many and various calls for absolute rules."" Two of the de-
mands which were rejected by the court were: (1) a requirement of a
Chapter X proceeding whenever the securities are publicly held; (2) a
requirement that Chapter X is the only proper proceeding when, as in the
73. 320 F.2d at 950. The court noted: "The developments are reviewed in a series of
articles, Weintraub, Levin, and Novick, Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for the
Middle-Sized Corporation, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 616 (1956); Weintraub and Levin, A Sequel
to Chapter X or Chapter XI: Coexistence for the Middle-Sized Corporation, 26 Fordliam
L. Rev. 292 (1957); Weintraub and Levin, Availability of Bankruptcy Rehabilitation to the
Middle-Sized Corporation: The Third Circuit's Interpretation, 14 Rutgers L. Rev. 564
(1960)." Id. at 948 n.10. See also Weintraub & Levin, Reorganization or Arrangement: Anl
Analysis of Contemporary Trends in Recent Cases, 37 Ref. J. 103 (1963).
74. 337 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1964).
75. Id. at 909.
76. Id. at 910.
77. Id. at 910-11.
78. Id. at 911; see text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
79. Id. at 911.
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instant case, some of the unsecured debt is publicly held in the form of
debentures rather than in the form of trade debt."0
Finally, the court endeavored to set its own criteria s1 for a refusal to
transfer: (1) "the proposed arrangement should be fair and equitable to
all interests on its face";' 2 (2) the proposed arrangement should be
feasible; (3) no need should exist for capitalization or replacement of
management; (4) there should be no irregularities; (5) a good prospect
should exist for future business; (6) an unstable financial history will
militate against a sound future; and (7) adequate and full information is
to be supplied to all who assent to the plan 3
As against these factors which favored "caution and supervision, ' *A the
court must weigh the time and money consumed by a Chapter XI proceed-
ing; the possibility that disruption of needed credit may result from a
transfer; the possibility that an effective reorganization will not emerge
from a Chapter XI proceeding; and, finally, since the bankruptcy court is
a court of equity, it must make sure that the Bankruptcy Act is used to
achieve the equitable ends for which it was designed35
Following the Crumpton case, the Second Circuit decided SEC v.
Canandaigua Enterprises Corp."' In analyzing the "needs" test, the court
observed that, although the results were fairly accurate and predictable
"in cases at the ends of the spectrum, it is a highly erratic guide in the
broad middle range. 67 Corporations such as the debtor require the
features of both chapters. After commenting on the benefits to be obtained
from both chapters,"6 the court stated:
The "needs" for the two chapters are not only conflicting but largely imponderable;
we know of no scale sufficiently sensitive to weigh the near certainty of achic-ving a
Chapter XI arrangement that may not be altogether fair and equitable against the
possible emergence of a better plan from a Chapter X proceeding during which the
patient may die before an operating room is ready or for which the fees of the
surgeon and others in attendance may exceed the patient's means. In the abEence
of studies of the workings of the two chapters, decision by the district judge is
almost bound to reflect his particular experience and predilections.80
In an effort to obtain some degree of absoluteness in transfer cases, the
80. Ibid.
81. Id. at 911-12; see commentaries cited note 73 supra.
82. 337 F.2d at 911-12.
83. Ibid.
84. Id. at 912.
85. Ibid.
86. 339 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1964). Judge Friendly, who wrote the opinion, had aizo written
for the court in the Grayson-Robinson case.
87. Id. at 18.
88. Id. at 1S-19.
89. Id. at 19.
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court considered a provision of setting a ceiling on debt in Chapter XI
cases, which would require the appointment of a mandatory trustee, and
concluded that this was a matter for congressional action; " the court also
commented that readjustment of corporations with publicly held secu-
rities as requiring resort to Chapter X was disapproved by General
Stores." However, General Stores did not preclude the court from ruling
that the need for a readjustment of publicly held debt creates a presumption in
favor of Chapter X, whereas a case calling only for modification of the claims of
trade creditors or others who have had private dealings with the debtor is pre-
sumptively to be handled under Chapter XIJ.2
V. THE American Trailer Rentals CASE
The propriety of the transfer was succinctly stated by Mr. Justice
Goldberg, in SEC v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 3 as a determination
whether the debtor's attempted rehabilitation under the Bankruptcy Act
materially affected "the rights of widespread public investor creditors"0"
or "whether dismissal or . . . transfer [was] . . . required.""5 The facts
indicated that American Trailer Rentals Company was engaged in the
automobile trailer rental business which was financed largely through the
sale of trailers to investors and their simultaneous lease-back. The Court
indicated that between 1959 and 1961 hundreds of small investors, dis-
persed throughout the western states, had purchased and leased back
5,866 trailers."
The lease-back agreement provided that the trailer owners would re-
ceive a two per cent return of their investment per month for ten years.
These trailers were placed by the debtor at gasoline stations and the
operators of these stations acted as the debtor's rental agents. There were
about 500 of such service stations in operation at the time that the petition
for an arrangement was filed. The further offering of these sale and lease-
back arrangements to the public was halted in 1961. The Commission
notified the debtor that these sale and lease-back arrangements were
securities which could not be sold to the public until the debtor filed the
necessary registration statement. The debtor filed a statement with the
SEC, which never became effective, and suit was commenced to stop the
distribution of the debtor's prospectus on the ground that it contained
false and misleading statements.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. 379 U.S. 594 (1965).
94. Id. at 597.
95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 598.
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After this attempt to register failed, an officer of the debtor and other
persons organized a corporation named Capitol Leasing Corporation
which offered American's investor-creditors an exchange of Capitol's
stock for their trailers on the basis of one share for every two dollars that
the investor-creditors had paid for the trailer. When a certain number of
the trailers had been acquired, the Commission revoked the exemption
from registration of small offerings upon which Capitol had relied. The
ground for the suspension was that there was reasonable cause to believe
that there were false and misleading statements in the offering material.
The debtor then filed the petition under Chapter XI. At the time of the
filing, the debtor listed its total assets to be 6S5,608 dollars and its lia-
bilities to be 1,367,890 dollars, of which 710,597 dollars was owed to
trailer owners.
The plan provided that the investor-trailer owners were to exchange
their entire interest for stock of Capitol on the basis of one share of stock
for each two dollars of remaining capital invested in the trailers. The
debtor's officers and directors, as well as trade and other general creditors,
were to receive one share of stock for each three dollars and fifty cents
of their claims. The debtor itself received 107,000 shares for the transfer
of its trailer rental system to Capitol. American would then distribute the
stock to its stockholders. Finally, unsecured obligations to two banks
totalling 55,558 dollars were to be paid in full, presumably because the
officers and directors of American were subject to liability as guarantors.
The ultimate results of the plan, as summarized by the Court, indicated
that, if the plan were approved, a total of 866,000 shares of Capitol stock
would be issued to trailer owners, but approximately 81,500 shares would
be issued directly to the officers and directors, 22,400 to the trade and
other general creditors, and 107,000 to the debtor itself to be distributed
to its stockholders 7
The district court recognized the fact that, in view of the wide distribu-
tion of the individual holdings, the proposed plan's issuance of approxi-
mately fifteen per cent of Capitol stock to debtor's officers would mean
that they, rather than the investor-trailer owners, would have effective
control over Capitol, and expressed disapproval of such a result, as well
as the preferential treatment to the banks. 3 However, the district court
adopted the referee's findings and denied the motion to transfer. The
Tenth Circuit affirmed, basing its decision upon the district court's discre-
tionP9
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court agreed with both
97. Id. at 602.
93. Id. at 602-03.
99. In the Matter of American Trailer Rentals Co., 325 F.2d 47, 52 (10th Cir. 1963).
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parties that the principles of United States Realty and General Stores
applied.100 The court rejected the argument raised in Wilcox-Gay that
Chapter X must be used in all of the cases involving the rights of public
investor creditors and that, in every case involving such investors, the
fair and equitable doctrine must be applied.' Furthermore, as part of its
argument, the Commission stated that it had no right to intervene in
Chapter XI cases except for the transfer section. The Court rejected this
argument and stated that the Commission had a right to intervene and to
be heard in a Chapter XI proceeding.0 2
Although there was no absolute rule requiring that Chapter X was to be
utilized in every case in which the debtor was publicly owned or publicly
held debt was to be adjusted, the Court, nevertheless, citing the Canan-
daigua case,' 0 ' stated that "as a general rule Chapter X is the appropriate
proceeding for adjustment of publicly held debt."M4
In commenting on the General Stores case, the Court stated that the
holdings of that case indicated that there were narrow limits to the excep-
tion of the general rule: (1) simple compositions may be effected under
Chapter XI even where public debt is directly affected; °0 (2) "even
though there may be no public debt.., affected, Chapter X is... the ap-
propriate proceeding where the debtor has widespread public stockholders
and the protections of the public and private interests involved afforded
by Chapter X are required .... ,,o0
In reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court rejected the appel-
lant's argument that language in General Stores indicated that the district
court's decision was not an abuse of discretion, and held:
Nothing in that opinion supports respondent's view that the issue of whether
Chapter X or Chapter XI is required permits open-ended discretion by a district
court to decide on a case-by-case basis, without reliance on the principles which
we have here reaffirmed, whether in its opinion it would be better for a particular
debtor to be in Chapter X or Chapter XI. We agree with the statement of the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a recent decision that such open-ended discretion
would be bound to result in decisions reflecting the "particular experience and pre-
dilections" of the district judge involved. SEC v. Canandaigna Enterprises Corp .... 1 0 7
The first of the appellate cases following the decision of American
Trailer Rentals was SEC v. Burton.108 The lower court had denied the
100. 379 U.S. at 610.
101. Id. at 611.
102. Id. at 612-13.
103. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
104. 379 U.S. at 613.
105. Id. at 614.
106. Id. at 614-15.
107. Id. at 619-20. (Footnote omitted.)
108. 342 F.2d 783 (lst Cir. 1965).
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Commission's motion to dismiss"0 9 and, while an appeal was pending,
American Trailer Rentals was decided by the Supreme Court. The Com-
mission then moved for a remand to the district court to reconsider its
opinion in the light of the criteria set up in United States Realty and
General Stores. The court granted the remand for the lower court to re-
consider
the orderliness of the plan of arrangement and the economy of Chapter M proceed-
ings, and [to give] . . . sufficient weight to the need for new management, the need
for investigation by a disinterested trustee of alleged past management inefficiency,
lack of skill and even wrongdoing, and the need for application of the "abTolute
priority" rule of Chapter X but not of Chapter XI.l u1
On remand, the district court 1 denied the motion to dismiss and care-
fully considered the criteria of American Trailer Rentals, distinguishing
them from the instant case: (1) the waiver of interest of public debt as
provided in the plan was a minor adjustment;" (2) "investigations of the
affairs of the debtor [by the receiver and special counsel failed] . .. to
uncover any misconduct or wrongdoing on the part of past manage-
ment; ""3 (3) new management had operated the business since the filing
of the Chapter XI petition;" 4 (4) the plan is feasible and future opera-
tions will be profitable;15 (5) a transfer to Chapter X would be costly
"and protracted proceedings of Chapter X, where the rule of strict
priorities prevails, could well lead to disaster for the subordinated
creditors and stockholders of the debtor."" 0
VI. CONCLUSION
The fundamental thrust which emerges in all these cases is the position
of the Commission that it protect the public investor against a plan which
is not fair because of the failure to adopt the fair and equitable doctrine
or because of the failure to hold management accountable for its misdeeds.
Particularly in those cases which do not need a reorganization of its
capital structure, the machinery of Chapter XI provides adequate relief
at a quicker pace, with less disturbance and cost.
Along these lines, some established principles should be re-evaluated:
(1) Where a debtor is insolvent in the bankruptcy sense, transfer to
Chapter X will be meaningless, since the stockholder's equity will be
109. In re American Guar. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 961 (D.RI. 1963).
110. 342 F.2d at 785.
111. In re American Guar. Corp., 246 F. Supp. 322 (D.RI. 1965).
112. Id. at 327.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid
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eliminated. It may be sounder to protect the public by allowing a debtor to
remain in Chapter XI, thereby avoiding the stringency of the fair and
equitable doctrine.
(2) Since the Commission may intervene in Chapter XI proceedings,
protection of the public investor is assured since it is not necessary in
every case to have the meticulous surveillance of a Chapter X proceeding.
(3) Since existing management is often the only source of attracting
new capital and credit to the operations, the courts should consider as a
precondition to a transfer, the continuance of such a source.
(4) Proper weight should be given to the importance of irregularities
which may be minor in some instances and major in others.
(5) More weight should be given to the interests of creditors who,
notwithstanding their superior position vis-A-vis stockholders, may still
prefer a subordinate position in Chapter XI as being in their best in-
terests.
(6) The motion to transfer should be made before the referee in
bankruptcy who is in charge of the Chapter XI case because of his
greater familiarity with the case.117
Finally, it may be that the conflict cannot be resolved even with the aid
of all of the guiding principles enunciated by the courts. Indeed, some
thought exists that the answer may only be found in a new chapter for
the middle-sized corporation, in between Chapter X and Chapter XI.118
However, until such a chapter is enacted, the foregoing proposals are
presented for a more equitable disposition of corporate debtor proceed-
ings.
117. See Committee on Arrangements and Reorganization of the National Bankruptcy
Conference, Proposal No. 1 (1963).
118. National Bankruptcy Conference, Resolution No. 3 (1965): "Resolved, that the
Conference approves the proposal that the Committee on Arrangements and Reorganization
study the desirability of including another chapter in the Bankruptcy Act to satisfy the needs
of the so-called 'middle-sized corporation.'"
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